Cybersecurity, tailored
to your mission.

Work alongside our engineers on architecture, security controls and the secure development lifecycle of a product as it evolves.

We review designs, map trust boundaries and data flows, and help your team assess security decisions before and during implementation. The collaboration can cover a new system, a migration or changes to an existing product, with focused investigation and validation where needed.

We also build application security into your development cycle (SSDLC). We select, implement and tune SAST, DAST and SCA for your stack and CI/CD pipeline, define the thresholds at which a build fails, and triage what the tools report, so engineers receive findings that are real and actionable rather than a queue of alerts. Where it fits, we use tooling we maintain, such as Security Gate.

Investigate how your system can be compromised, with reproducible evidence and guidance for remediation.

We scope the assessment around the product's threat model and attack surface. Depending on the system, the work combines application and infrastructure testing, architecture and code review, and reverse engineering. We investigate attack chains, explain their impact and retest the fixes.

Build the fuzzers, analyzers and instrumentation needed to investigate your system.

We develop tools around specific formats, interfaces and behaviors, from test harnesses to custom analysis. The scope defines what the tool must examine and how your team will use it, whether for a focused investigation or repeated testing.

Some of that work runs on language models where they do better than a fixed rule: reviewing code changes for security-relevant behavior before they merge, triaging analyzer output against the code it points to, or testing your own model-based features for prompt injection and data exposure. Each one is measured against the cases it must catch before your team relies on it.

We do not run the response; we join the team that does, for one part of it: establishing how the intrusion began, and proving it rather than asserting it.

Most of what an incident demands belongs to the team already handling it: containment, eradication, communication. We do not take that over. We join for the way in. We take the evidence back to the specific weakness that made the intrusion possible and then demonstrate that weakness, reproducing the path instead of naming a probable cause, so the conclusion still holds when someone questions it. What comes out is not a narrative but a finding: an entry point with evidence, a severity, a deadline and a retest, linked on the platform to the affected systems and to the timeline of the investigation it came from. This is worth commissioning for a narrow set of incidents. When the way in is already understood, or when nothing technical was exploited at all, there is nothing for us to prove, and we say so before the work starts rather than after.

We assess what a transaction brings with it, a company, a codebase or a product you are about to adopt, on the timeline the transaction allows.

A decision to acquire, invest in or adopt something is made against a deadline, and usually with less access than an ordinary engagement. We work within both. Before a deal closes we establish the security posture of what is being bought to the depth the available access permits, and separate what is merely untidy from what becomes expensive later. Once it closes, the same engineers examine the acquired systems with the access ownership now allows, and state what has to be resolved before the environments are joined. The same work applies when you are evaluating a product rather than a company: we assess it on your behalf, with no relationship to its vendor. In each case the result is a record on the platform, where every finding carries evidence, severity and a deadline and stays open until it is fixed, so the assessment keeps working for whoever owns the system afterwards.